Queensland moved its energy megaprojects under an investment corporation. Both have been cut.

Two of Queensland's largest energy projects have been moved out of the delivery bodies that were running them and placed under the oversight of the Queensland Investment Corporation.

CopperString. Previously delivered by Powerlink Queensland. Following a QIC review, the government announced in October 2025 that QIC would oversee delivery.

Borumba Pumped Hydro. Previously led by Powerlink Queensland, now led by Queensland Hydro — with QIC having taken on management responsibilities for Queensland Hydro and oversight of a revised business case.

In both cases the projects have been reduced or reopened. Queensland has separately shelved the Mt Rawdon pumped hydro project.

What changed on each

CopperString: the voltage came down

The QIC review identified $2.1 billion in savings. The largest single component was reverting the Eastern Link from 500 kilovolts to 330 kilovolts.

Its cost had run from $1.8 billion in 2020, to $5 billion in 2023, to $9 billion, to $13.9 billion once essential network connections were included.

The review also produced a delivery model change: CopperString is to be delivered as a regulated asset, with a new regulated entity established to develop, construct, operate and maintain the Eastern Link — shifting cost recovery from state funding toward network charges under Australian Energy Regulator oversight.

The western link has been scaled back, with renewable micro-grids proposed to fill the gap.

Borumba: the business case was reopened

Queensland Hydro and QIC are undertaking a revised business case that will determine the project's scope, costs and schedule. It was expected mid-2026.

The original four-package procurement structure — Pumped Hydro Energy Storage, Upper Dam, Lower Dam, and Original Equipment Manufacturing — is described as the old scope, superseded pending that review.

Reported figures put the project at around $18.4 billion, an increase of roughly $4 billion, with delivery not before 2033 and a risk-adjusted completion of July 2035. State equity committed in the 2023-24 Budget was $6 billion.

The government has indicated it is open to a smaller version of the project.

Why an investment corporation changes the outcome

This is the part worth understanding, because it is a governance change with direct construction consequences.

A delivery body optimises for delivery. Powerlink is a transmission network operator. Its expertise is building and running transmission, and its instinct on a difficult project is to solve the engineering problem.

An investment corporation optimises for return and risk. QIC manages the state's investments. Putting it over a delivery body means the project is assessed on whether the capital is justified — not only on whether it can be built.

Those two questions produce different answers. Engineering asks how. Investment asks whether, and at what size.

And the lever an investment review pulls is scope. CopperString did not become cheaper through productivity or better procurement. It became cheaper by carrying less voltage. That is the mechanism, and it is the same one visible in Victoria's $2 billion technical review of the Suburban Rail Loop.

What it means for contractors

Scope reduction arrives after pricing and mobilisation. On CopperString, UGL and CPB Contractors held the Early Contractor Involvement and early works, and are preferred contractors for the EPC subject to approvals and financing. A delivery model change and a voltage reduction land on a position already taken.

A regulated entity is a different counterparty. Contracting to a state-owned corporation spending appropriated funds is not the same as contracting to a regulated entity recovering through network charges. The second has less commercial latitude on variations, because every dollar is eventually tested by a regulator.

Work continues while the parameters are unsettled. Borumba is the sharper case: FKG Group took an interim civils contract in May 2026 and exploratory tunnelling went to tender in April, while the business case determining whether the project proceeds at full scope remains unpublished.

Watch which state entity holds the contract. Across these two projects, delivery responsibility has moved between Powerlink, Queensland Hydro, QIC and a proposed new regulated entity. Each transfer is a change of counterparty.

Is it working?

On cost control, arguably yes. A $2.1 billion identified saving on CopperString and a reopened business case on Borumba are exactly what an investment review is meant to produce. Queensland is one of the few jurisdictions visibly reducing megaproject scope rather than absorbing increases.

On capability, the question is open. A 330 kilovolt Eastern Link carries what the North West Minerals Province needs today. Whether it carries what the province needs if the critical minerals build-out accelerates is a different question — and the review has answered in favour of affordability.

On credibility, there is a cost. A pipeline where projects are announced, priced, contracted and then reduced teaches the market to price optionality into bids. Contractors who have been descoped once bid the next job differently.

What to watch

1. Publication of Borumba's revised business case, and whether the project is rescoped smaller.
2. Whether CopperString's $2.1 billion in identified savings is actually realised. Identified and delivered are different things.
3. Establishment of the new regulated entity for the Eastern Link, and the AER process that follows.
4. Whether UGL and CPB Contractors convert the ECI into the EPC after a scope reduction, and on what terms.
5. Whether other states adopt the model. Victoria's SRL technical review is the same instinct under a different name.

Published 1 September 2026 · Updated 7 September 2026